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Day: Three Monstrosities of Information

In response to the DOCAM 2020 conference theme of “monsters,” in this paper I
will address three monstrosities involving information and documentation. I will
do so by returning to themes discussed in three of my books: The Modern
Invention of Information, Discourse, History, and Power (2001), Indexing It All: The
Subject in the Age of Documentation, Information, and Data (2014), and
Documentarity: Evidence, Ontology, and Inscription (2019). These three books
form a trilogy, discussing information and information ages at three periods and
scales: the first book from the beginnings of the 20th century up through today,
the second book during philosophical and technological modernity, and in the
third book, the theoretically and practically deployed tradition of metaphysics in
“the West” for the past 2,500 years or so. I should add that the second book was
written as a sort of horror story done via concepts rather than characters, so the
conference theme really fits very well with the general outlook of that book and
it fits the other two books, as well.
In this paper I will limit myself to outlining three general forms for the
monstrosities or horrors of information: 1) the horror of information as the latest
trope in the Western metaphysical tradition of what Derrida termed, “presence,”
2) the horror of information as a mode of ideational subsumption of the empirical
via modern information technologies and their rationale of fulfilling individual
information needs, and 3) the horror of information and its related tropes and
practices as the deployment of presence across history and geography as modes
of inscription and representation, and through these, management and control.
We are living through a horrifying time right now, a time that has very legitimate
fears and present horrors and portends even worse horrors—the worst horrors
human beings and other species as a whole have ever encountered, namely those
leading to individual suffering and mass extinction. Trumpism, the COVID-19
epidemic, and climate change are, when and where I write today, daily terrors.
Each of these has been, at least partially, afforded by the above monstrosities of
information. These horrors can only be changed by critically engaging these
monstrosities, critically engaging the history and rhetoric of information, and
through this, critically engaging Western metaphysics as it appears in theory and
in practice.
1.
The major theme of The Modern Invention of Information is that the
understanding and social construction of “information,” in terms of this word
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connoting metaphysical presence, is a relatively recent development, particularly
during the 20th century. The book also argues that this modern sense of
information also colors the historiography and sociology of information, so that
each information age appears anew, erasing the history of previous ones and
denying its own historical materialism. (Thus, in the 20th century, there was not
only “information,” but before this, “documentation,” and still to come “data,”
each term being a trope for the same sense of presence.) As Nunberg (1996) and
Frohmann (2004) argued as well, the term “information” is an overly inflated term,
which not only lacks an historical understanding of how it got this way but also
actively erases such by its very sense of representing something given, something
empirically and epistemically present in and of itself. In its modern sense,
“information” as a substantive noun makes us believe that the term refers to an
entity, rather than suggesting that “information” refers to various documentary
types or genres or is what we say we have as the result of being informed of
something. The appearance of “information” with the internet was the advent of
this ideational substantive in regard to widespread digital media (“new media”),
supposedly freed from paper forms of information, such as paper-based
documents. As such, information supposedly challenged the cost and distribution
models of paper-based documentation and the institutions that produced and
collected such (e.g., traditional publishers and libraries). Electronic “information”
was said to be free, or nearly so, or wanting to be so, in contrast to paper-based
information. In reality, of course, internet information has increasingly become
mediated by corporate entities and the ideological constraints of users and
providers. The argument that “information” is immaterial and that documents are
material is a red herring, based on sloppy uses of the term “immaterial” and
“documents.” There are digital documents and internet information is mediated
by providers, user needs, algorithms, and search engines.
“Presence” is the term that Jacques Derrida used to describe the Western
metaphysical tradition’s manner of understanding being. A metaphysics of
presence assumes that the essence of being is transcendental to time and space,
and it is self-identical or “auto-affective” in its construction (Gasché, 1986).
We should understand that presence is also the form of knowledge for the
metaphysical tradition (through philosophical modernism for both rationalism—
Descartes’ notion of “clear and distinct” knowledge—and Lockean empiricism’s
simple ideas, up through logical positivism’s notions of statements). In Plato’s
works, every entity is seen as having an essence that is changeless in its form or
idea (eidos) and truth is the correspondence of knowledge to this.
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Correspondence theory runs through European medieval philosophy and its
doctrine of adaequatio rei et intellectus, and up through twentieth century
positivism’s picture theory, and in documentation and information science it is
clearly seen in Otlet’s notion of “facts” (see Frohmann, 2007), bibliography, and
“the Book,” and these knowledge claims echo in the internet’s small “chunk”
rhetorical forms of webpages and memes. (In English and many other European
languages, the term “fact” has both an ontological and an epistemic sense, and
these are often used ambiguously with one another and as a grammatical support
for the above epistemologies—for example, in the perfectly understandable, but
logically ambiguous, English language sentence: “the facts of the world are given
in the facts that the book presents [i.e., represents about them].”) From a
positivist perspective, science is made up of statements—truths—that picture the
world, a world which itself can be viewed as distinct entities and events. Truth is
made up of the epistemic re-presentation of what is, as present, the
correspondence of the essence of things and intellect.
The great, and still ongoing, historical transition between medieval semiotically
formed knowledge (where correspondence is governed by coherence theories of
truth) and modern experimental knowledge involves struggles between the
power and methods of representation and those of entities themselves in forming
presence, that is, in making the appearance of what is evident into evidence.
Today’s informational representations taken as knowledge often return us to the
medieval realm where narrative or visual representational coherence is seen as
grounds for truth. This has resulted in a great political tragedy, where belief has
replaced hard-won knowledge and knowledge institutions built during modernity.
Today, “information” is often the literal or metaphorical image of knowledge and
its truths or potential truths. This is to say, that knowledge and its truths or
potential truths are representational, or simply, based in the imagination (—
whether they will result in genuine knowledge or not is a more complex question).
The Modern Invention of Information attempted to reassert the material
(including rhetorical) and historical production of the concept of information, of
informational forms and the concept of the information age, against their erasure
by information age rhetoric throughout the 20th century. The erasure of the
production of information led to inflated claims about new information and
communication technologies, and it led to information age rhetoric and
commercial institutions that put on the defensive older knowledge institutions,
such as libraries, government science and research institutions, universities, and
so on.
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We should recall that a similar displacement of older knowledge institutions by
new information and communication technologies (e.g., cinema, radio, and
nascent television, along with the expanded sphere of newspaper production—
i.e., “alternative news”—) happened in Nazi Germany in the 1930s, but in the
1990s and throughout the early 21st century no one was making the connection
between this earlier event and the information revolution. Instead, neoliberal
technological deterministic discourses celebrated “the information highway” and
digital corporate “innovation,” and on the other hand, libertarian and political Left
discourses in different manners from one another equally celebrated information
“freedom” and new emerging singularities supposedly rising out of new
possibilities of expression through these new technologies. Technological
utopianism was everywhere. No one really saw the resurrection of fascist
tendencies and their empowerment by these newer technologies, even when they
did recognize the developing remediation of the internet by old media at the end
of the last century and the beginning of this century.
The horror of information in The Modern Invention of Information is the horror of
the trope of information as a form of presence and representation that erases its
historical, epistemic, and material construction in the real world. The attempt of
this book as a critical work was to reassert the materiality of information through
historical critique.
Today, the monstrosity of the modern invention of information and its
technological and socio-cultural deployment can be seen most dominantly in fake
news and other such phenomena, where the term “information” covers all sorts
of rhetorical genres of texts, documents, images, conversational fragments,
fiction, non-fiction and everything in between—anything found through digital
means, and all being treated as having truth values or possible truth values worthy
of our attention, and each judged the same way as one another. However, behind
the allure and addiction of the screen and digital social connection in an otherwise
divided, lonely, and consumerist society, lies rhetorical, ideological, and
algorithmic mechanisms that mediate the “user,” with only a small subset of
“information” resources belonging to processes of knowledge institutions and
knowledge processes. Knowledge is only a small subset of what is available on the
internet, only a small subset of “information,” with the majority of documentary
and social media texts and linkages serving likes or dislikes, that is, taste. The
seeking of information on the internet is largely driven by taste and by beliefs, not
by knowledge (though the taste for knowledge may well be a driving factor). The
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proliferation of the belief that the internet has given us “facts” (as the product of
knowledge institutions and knowledge processes) is largely untrue.
2.
The theme of Indexing it All is the horror of Hegelian dialectical subsumption,
which is the horror of the uncritical or narcissistic dialectical seeking and gathering
of beings and events for the purpose of the subject’s self-realization through
them. It is a horror because such an event is never started or completed by the
subject him or herself, but by the cultural forms and social norms that make up
the subject as a product of deeper grammatological forms and psychological and
socio-political development, and so this drive of subsumption (in information
science, of the seeking, hunting, and gathering of information) is, literally, ideologically informed without realizing it. The horror is not only the informational
appropriation of entities, but that the critical difference above is not revealed, but
instead, erased with modern information (as was suggested in The Modern
Invention of Information).
In Indexing it All, the dialectic is shown through the subject’s solicitude and
positioning toward documents and proto-documents (that is, in terms of what is
evidence and is evident) as opposite the subject, as objects of use for the subject
(or “user”). But Indexing it All shows that the subject’s needs and uses are actually
formed by documents and their collections, and both user needs and
documentary contents are inscribed in constellations of cultural forms and
tendencies toward their deployment in social norms—that is, they are inscribed
in rationalities of ideas (i.e., ideologies). As any reference librarian knows, user
needs, and so, the subject as a subject-of-(information)-needs, can only be
expressed through the collections of documents and the metadata available to
them, and these collections themselves reflect constellations of ideas in society
and selected and made available through publishers. The same principle resides
with the internet, though on a much greater and less scholarly scale.
Indexing it All examines the modern conception of information in terms of
information seeking and retrieval, as a system of dialectically formed
“information” relations within three different modern sciences: documentation,
information science, and data science. The dialectical logic common to each of
these is users as subjects (of information needs) and documents as objects of that
need. The traditional account of this relationship in modern library science and
information science of the past hundred and fifty years or so is that users have
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information needs and information systems fulfill those needs with documents,
accessed through their metadata or other means of representing, indexing, and
organizing documents according to their documentary “subject” contents, that is
to say, their “aboutness.” However, to repeat: this book argues that it is the
information systems that define the nature of the subject’s information needs
(and that of the psychological subject—the so-called “user”) through collections
of documents and their representation through subject headings or other
metadata and the indexing and algorithms that bring (co-index or co-position) the
subjects and objects together, and that these are all inscribed by common
constellations and grammars of cultural forms and social norms.
As Michael Buckland has written, information indexes are backward facing in time
(2012). Buckland’s insight is very important. The critical user of an information
system realizes that instead of looking into the future, she, like Walter Benjamin’s
angel of history, is being blown into the future while looking at the past, with
heaps of language piling up at her feet. Information systems index documents,
which are made up of collected cultural forms and social norms from the past, and
these then help shape the future in a literate society. In a literate society—
particularly, as today, one so heavily and daily mediated by not only past records
but the recirculation and persistence of past records—Buckland’s observation is
especially insightful and important. As mediated by information systems, our
expressions follow the logic (literally, through mediated taxonomies,
programming, and graph algorithms) of past linguistic and social grammars. We
like to think of our lives today as being very immediate, but our immediate
attention is heavily indexed to, and so mediated by, past textual and documentary
forms. And such literacy is not always beneficial for relationships toward each
other and the world. (“Read” the ALA posters say—but we read now more than
ever and many of us are not very knowledgeable.)
So, the monstrosity of the modern episteme of information is that ideology guides
the subject into their subjectivity as an “information seeker” or “user” via systems
of signs and their norms for use, while at the same time the subject sees him or
herself (and is seen as such within information seeking and user studies) as an
agent of free will and choice. This belief in the free will or “rational choice” of the
user ignores, however, that the information “user” is used by information and
communication systems, which serve a sociotechnical political economy of
“needs” as shaped by that economy, e.g., based in immediate and attention-based
time biases and human and natural exploitation. Current information systems do
serve needs: first of all, the needs of current political, cultural, social, and above
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all, financial economies, and then the psychological needs of users as shaped
within these. We should rethink our relationship to, particularly, “commercial
providers” and their algorithms if we desire life values and futures other than what
we have.
I will add that when Indexing it All was published in 2014 the internet was still
largely being seen in digital studies and cultural theory as a distinct and final break
from twentieth century mass media, mass psychology, and fascist politics, a site
of “emergent” singularities rather than representational subjects mediated and
manufactured by old politics and media systems. After this book was published, I
thought that I had perhaps overstated the case for ideological positioning via
information and information technologies, that I was too pessimistic. But then
Donald Trump was elected president, not simply through old media, but very
much aided through remediated new media. Masses of people had voted for a
figure of old prejudices and hate and a politics of mystified and falsified beliefs—
in sum, a fascist politician—at the very height of the “information revolution”!
Trump is a figure of the old media who circulates on the new media with even
more power than when he was a TV personality. (Italians had earlier seen
something like this with Berlusconi in Italy, though before the more robust rollout
of the internet and social media.) The racist and nationalist father had returned
with all its prejudices and viciousness in order to color experience and to return
experience to the user in terms of that coloration. This figure and its social and
cultural figurations historically returned, with even more power than previously,
not despite, but thanks to the internet, or at least the internet once it had been
remediated by not only the corporations, but the logic, of old media—that is, the
logic of culturally and socially positioning needs within normative collections of
choices. The past was and is not dead, but lying and indexed there, waiting to be
reawakened more fully. In evidentiary or pseudo-evidentiary information systems,
which are based on the past, and with the heavily information mediated subject
driven by the past’s political unconscious, the possibility of this reawakening is not
just virtual, but real.
Indexing it All was written as a sort of horror novel composed of concepts,
depicting the Hegelian dialectic of Right as it occupies and organizes individuals
and society through documentation, information, and data systems and their
“sciences” (—that is, science largely understood as engineering projects, which in
the case of information, is not just technological, but social and cultural
engineering).
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I was rather horrified at what my book suggested. I also felt, however, that the
horror was much, much deeper--historically, socially, and geographically than
modern information and its technologies and sciences. So, I wanted to write about
the much deeper and broader horror and technologies behind modern indexing—
the social and cultural positioning and co-positioning—of persons and documents
by ideologies and prejudices. And so, my next book, Documentarity, evolved, out
of a fascination with the question of the figuration of being and truth in terms of
what becomes evident and how it is afforded or allowed that evidence by different
genres of inscription and expression, particularly in regard to practices (and limits)
of representation.
3.
Documentarity: Evidence, Ontology, and Inscription (2019) was an attempt to
extend my earlier readings of information as a kind of figuration across literatures,
genres, methods, and history. The book examines the emergence of what is (what
becomes evident and present) and how it is taken as what is (how it is represented
as evidence). The book tries to account for powerful particulars in their singularity
and their capture and mediation by a priori and a posteriori systems of
representational evidence. The appearance of something as evident, and then
something taken as evidential, in the mode of information, is read in terms of the
various inscriptional techne for such, from ancient philosophy through
contemporary computation.
Recalling Erich Auerbach’s famous book Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in
Western Literature, Documentarity overviews the relation between powerful
particulars and Western genres of representation in the domain of inscriptionality
or “literature” writ large, a domain which has recently become understood as
“information.” The book asks, “what is information and informational?” in various
genres and practices, from what’s seen today as the humanities through the social
sciences and computational engineering. Throughout the book, the problem of
Suzanne Briet’s antelope (an inquiry that runs throughout these three books)
remains in the background: namely, the status of the antelope before, during, and
after its capture and its transformation into being a zoological type by
documentary institutions. This story, which begins Briet’s 1951 book, Qu’est-ce
que la documentation? (Briet, 1951), exemplifies the expansion of Western
science as “progress” following the Second World War, which she sees being led
by documentation as a “cultural technique.” (Curiously, Bruno Latour’s very
different account of documentary processes and information, which, however,
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uses a similar account of colonial zoological capture, similarly passes over the
colonial and anthropomorphic intonations of its example (1987, 1996).)
In Documentarity, Briet’s story of the antelope is emblematic of the seeking,
appropriation, and use of entities as “information,” and this suggests the problem
of the modes or genres of inscriptionality of things as evidence for something
other than their particular selves (for example, their type identities within natural
or social science classifications or everyday social ontologies).
These types of appropriative inscriptions underlie the mechanisms of colonial and
postcolonial management in Western culture and then worldwide in modernity
and are the foundations for the Anthropocene and its continuation. They are the
basis for our system of reproduction as a system of industrial production,
following a teleological causal model that utilizes short-sighted human and natural
resource appropriation and exploitation. Nietzsche through Heidegger discussed
these inscriptionalities as occurring not only through material and technological,
but through social, cultural, and moral devices. For Nietzsche these are
mechanisms or devices of the will to power, or for Heidegger, the mode of
appropriative solicitude toward others understood as objects, known through the
psychological disposition of “the will.” Within the disposition of the will, other
people and entities, and the world itself, are seen as means toward the will’s ends,
and so they are re-presented to the will as elements of worlds understood as
external to the self. This is that, and as that it can be used or not used for what the
will wants and wills toward.
A concern with the history of epistemic capture and control, of documentation
and of information, of colonialism and anthropocentrism, of appropriation
through and as information, has occupied my work since I first started studying
information as a graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley. It is
the problem of presence as a function of representation and its means for control
through communication, information, and media technologies. These devices of
recording and record keeping, of which the ideational categories of Platonic forms
are the exemplary epistemic device for the metaphysical tradition, are products
of not only writing, but writing as a more permanent or “fixed” (i.e., documentary)
form, and earlier, in oral traditions, of mnemonics. These are devices for the will,
that is, devices for the appropriation of others according to the representational
imagination as a means of fixity and control.
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If the Anthropocene is to be reversed, it will require a life philosophy that breaks
free from these habits, that brackets these technologies; it will require modes of
everyday human being that see beyond the will’s imagination. It will require a
value of time fundamentally at odds with our current life and modernity. We
require a philosophy of life that both starts and ends with community or beingwith (Mitsein), stretching across the entire animal sphere with this notion, and we
need as our core value a sense of reproduction that is responsible for future
generations far ahead of us. And this strikes directly into the problem of not just
the ego, not just industrial technology, but into the long historical culture of
information, into the history of the inscription and recording of beings.
Etymologically, to “record” is to repeat what is at heart. The horror recounted in
Documentarity is that the heart can be stopped and removed in order to be
preserved, and be preserved in order to control those whose heart continues to
beat. With “information,” whether in older or newer documentary systems, there
remains the problem of the relation of being to beings. The relation of information
to the living and the dead, and more importantly to those still to come, lies at the
heart of the problem of information today.
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